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Additional data and discussion, complementary to the material in the book and referred to occasionally in the text, appears on the author's website at www.MonikaBednarek.com

1

Analyzing Language and Emotion

1.1 Introduction

While I was preparing the manuscript for this book in November 2006, a youth in Germany shot and wounded several of his fellow students, a teacher and the caretaker at his former school, before killing himself. Coincidentally, just days earlier I had finished a novel by the American writer Lionel Shriver about a similar scenario at an American high-school, which includes the following speech by the shooter (Kevin), addressed to his father:

'I don't care how your camera works.' he continued levelly. *'I don't want to be a location scout for a bunch of crappy products. I'm not interested. I'm not interested in baseball or the founding fathers or decisive battles of the Civil War. I hate museums and national monuments and picnics. I don't want to memorize the Declaration of Independence in my spare time or read de Tocqueville. I can't stand reruns of Tora, Tora, Tora! or documentaries about Dwight Eisenhower. I don't want to play Frisbee in the backyard or one more game of Monopoly with a snivelling, candy-ass, one-eyed midget. I don't give a fuck about stamp collecting or rare coins or pressing colorful autumn leaves in encyclopedias. And I've had it up to my eyeballs with heart-to-heart father-son talks about aspects of my life that are none of your business.'*

(Shriver 2006: 425–6, italics in original).

This is Kevin's response to his father's patronizing and rather simplistic behaviour towards him, and comes on the very day that Kevin kills members of his family, a teacher and several pupils at his high school. What is interesting about his response in the context of this book is

that it contains a lot of 'emotion talk': *I don't care, I don't want* (three occurrences), *I'm not interested* (two occurrences), *I hate, I can't stand, I don't give a fuck about, I've had it up to my eyeballs with*. These function to position Kevin contrary to the activities endorsed by his father, his father's desire for Kevin to be just like him, and, simultaneously, against his father himself. They provide evaluations of entities and behaviour, asserting Kevin's indifference, dislike and distaste towards what his father so whole-heartedly believes in (i.e. mainstream American ideologies and values). At the same time, they provide a characterization of Kevin's personality, rather than just pointing to momentary or transitional emotional states. The passage is about interests, likes and values, though tellingly these are only referred to in terms of what they are not, rather than in terms of what they are. The extract seems to represent Kevin's final emotional reaction towards his father's continual attempt to mould him, their relationship, and their family life into some idolized 'All-American' perfection, rather than accepting Kevin on his own terms. Crucially, Kevin's parents do not challenge or take him up on his words, though his emotional outburst is very unusual and extremely significant in light of his later deeds, indicating something of his 'true' state-of-mind and foreshadowing what later happens. His **emotion talk** is indeed very noteworthy.

Although this book is in no way about high-school killings or related phenomena, it is about emotion talk (using emotion terms) and its functions in discourse. It seeks to investigate how we use emotion talk in different types of text (the four registers of casual conversation, fiction, news reportage, and academic discourse) to position ourselves, to express evaluations and to provide information, and is aimed at all researchers interested in the use of emotion talk in naturally occurring discourse.

1.2 Emotion talk

Arguably, our emotions and how we talk about them are an essential part of what makes us all human. Even if animals may also have emotional experiences (Ekman 1992), humans can reasonably be regarded as the most emotional of all sentient beings (Mees 2006: 3). The study of human discourse about emotion therefore probes one of the most fundamental human characteristics.¹

However, our attitudes towards emotions themselves have in fact always been rather mixed, oscillating between the negative and the positive, with diverging dichotomies emerging in Western culture (Table 1.1 on p. 3).² The view of emotions as irrational probably goes back

Table 1.1 Attitudes towards emotion

	Emotion	Non-emotion
Emotion regarded as negative (distrust)	emotion natural irrational heart passion chaotic subjective physical unintended uncontrollable dangerous	ratio/intelligence/cognition cultural rational head reason ordered universal, objective mental/intellectual intended controllable not dangerous
Emotion regarded as positive (appreciation)	emotion life interpersonal connection free nature authentic	alienation death estrangement shackling civilization artificial

(After Lutz 1990: 69, Parrott 1995: 80–2, Daneš 2004, Oatley *et al.* 2006: 58).

as far as Plato's and Darwin's observations on emotions and emotional expression (Oatley *et al.* 2006: 58). Their conception as dangerous and uncontrollable is reflected in frequent talk about emotional control in interviews (Lutz 1990, Parrott 1995), and psychological discourse (for example, Fiehler 1990: 60, Ekman 1992: 189). The aspect of control is also very important in the metaphorical construction of emotions, with a focus on attempt at control, loss of control and lack of control (Kövecses 2000: 43). It is embodied in the 'master' metaphor for emotion, EMOTION IS FORCE (Kövecses 2000: 17), which is exemplified by fixed expressions such as:

- *He was seized by emotion.*
- *He was struggling with his emotions.*
(Kövecses 2000: chapter 5)

Further, Kidron & Kuzar (2002) point out that different cultural opinions about correct emotional behaviour are associated with the conceptualization of control with respect to emotional experience. The Anglo-American culture tends to emphasize 'self-restraint and control of emotions' (Kidron & Kuzar 2002: 134), which, as they argue, is reflected

by the way emotions are syntactically encoded in English. More specifically, for Americans, *being emotional* has negative connotations, and is linked to ‘losing control, confusing or mixed emotions, becoming irrational’ (Parrott 1995: 78). Males in Western culture appear reluctant to *accredit* (de Beaugrande 1992: 247) emotions, that is, accept and express emotional experience (but see Galasiński 2004).

Our attitudes towards, and thoughts and feelings about, emotions have been described as *meta-emotion philosophy*, and vary among cultures as well as individuals (Gottman *et al.* 1996: 243–5). From a different, more general perspective, the sociologist Arlie Hochschild talks of cultural ‘*emotion ideologies* about appropriate attitudes, feelings, and emotional responses in basic spheres of activity.’ (Turner & Stets 2005: 36). Meta-emotion philosophies and presumably also emotion ideologies, are reflected in discourse, with statements such as *Getting angry can be a relief* opposed to remarks like *Her shouting scares me* (Gottman *et al.* 1996: 267). Emotion talk can also reveal *emotional culture* (Gordon 1990) – what Stearns (1994, 1995 in Bamberg 1997b) calls the *emotional style* of a culture. Our ‘emotion talk’, then, may reveal our personal and cultural attitudes towards emotional experience but what else is its function? How do we talk about emotion in different situations, when do we do so and what is the purpose of this ‘emotion talk’? These are all questions that will be discussed throughout this book. The following sections give an overview of emotion research and outline the framework of analysis.

1.3 A brief history of emotion research

Emotions have been subject to a large number of empirical and theoretical studies, and it is impossible to do justice to all. Instead, only the most important ones (mainly in psychology, sociology and linguistics) are briefly reviewed. Concise overviews of many aspects of emotions can be found in Davidson *et al.* (2003) and Oatley *et al.* (2006), and there are also a myriad of handbooks and encyclopaedias of emotion research.

Essentially, emotion research was founded in the 19th century by Darwin, James and Freud (Oatley *et al.* 2006: 4–10), but emotions themselves have been a topic for much longer, starting with ancient philosophers such as Aristotle. They are a topic that is of interest to many disciplines: philosophy (for example, Marty 1908, Richards 1948, Black 1948, Bedford 1956/57, Wittgenstein 1967, Goldberg 1971, Belfrage 1986, Wollheim 2001, Robinson 2005); psychology (for example, Ortony *et al.* 1988, Ekman 1992, 1997, 1999a, Johnson-Laird & Oatley 1989, Braun 1992, Gallois 1994, Gottman *et al.* 1996, Mees 2006, Oatley *et al.*

2006); neuroscience (for example, Davidson *et al.* 2003: part 1); anthropology (for example, Abu-Lughod & Lutz 1990, Goodwin & Goodwin 2000, Milton & Svašek 2005); sociology (for example, Gordon 1990, Turner & Stets 2005); communication studies (Planalp 1999); linguistics (see below) and so on.

Some recurring issues in emotion research are:

- What is an emotion? How can emotions be defined?
- What is the structure of emotions?
- How can emotions be distinguished from each other?
- How can emotions be studied, measured, and described?
- Are emotions innate (biological) and universal, or acquired and culturally construed?
- Are there 'basic' (innate, universal, primary, cognitively salient) emotions and what are they?
- What is the relation between linguistic resources (providing labels for emotions) and emotional experience?

To review discussions of these aspects in detail would take us too far: for instance, there are more than a hundred definitions of emotion (Jahr 2000: 7; see for example, Mees 2006, Oatley *et al.* 2006 for overviews) and heated discussions on most of the other questions can be found as well. However, it is interesting that several definitions note that emotions include 'an eliciting condition, a cognitive evaluation, physiological activation, a change of action readiness, and finally an action' (Johnson-Laird & Oatley 1989: 82). The current consensus in emotion research seems to be that emotions are neither wholly universal nor wholly culturally determined, and that these two views are not completely incompatible (Parrot & Harré 1996: 2, Planalp 1999: 195). Some aspects of emotional behaviour are universal and rooted in biology (for example autonomic and central nervous system activity, facial expression) with the limbic system (the *amygdala*), the neocortex, subcortical regions of the brain, as well as hormones, neuromodulators, and transmitter substances related to emotional experience and emotion regulation (Turner & Stets 2005: 4–9, Oatley *et al.* 2006: chapter 6). At the same time, there is no doubt that other aspects of emotional experience are determined by socialization and cultural construal (even with respect to universal aspects such as facial expression), and there is both cultural, sub-cultural and individual variation (Ekman 1997, 1999b: 14, Ellsworth & Scherer 2003: 584, Schrauf & Sanchez 2004: 282, Oatley *et al.* 2006: 68–9, 97, 180). While there is a wealth of research on cultural constructivism

and emotions (for example Harré 1986, Fiehler 1990, Abu-Lughod & Lutz 1990, Harré & Parrott 1996, Oatley *et al.* 2006: 70–2), the most well-known (non-linguistic) research probably relates to Goffman's *dramaturgical/cultural theory*, Hochschild's establishment of *feeling rules* and Ekman's *display rules* (Ekman 1997, Turner & Stets 2005: 36–7). Dramaturgical theories see human behaviour as a scripted on-stage performance which is influenced by cultural norms and beliefs about emotional experience and expression, including feeling rules as generated by culture (Turner & Stets 2005: 23–4). These rules regulate emotional experience and management. *Emotion rules*, *manifestation rules*, *correspondence rules*, and *coding rules* regulate which emotions are to be expected in which intensity in social situations, how they are conventionally manifested, and how to react with the appropriate emotion – varying depending on social roles, gender, situation, culture (Fiehler 2002: 82–3). In Downes's words, 'culture specifies "what you are supposed to feel"' (Downes 2000: 108).

Aspects that seem to have an influence on the socialization of emotions are the development of *Über-ich*, conscience and ratio (Wilk 2005: 132), art (van Meel 1994: 163), as well as parent–child interaction and other microsocial interpersonal relationships through which macrosocial structures work (Gordon 1990: 147). Emotional intelligence, it seems, is learned in childhood, and emotion talk plays a crucial role in the socialization of emotions (Planalp 1999: 142–3). The talk of emotions and events that evoke them:

teach children about what events appropriately elicit emotions in their community, inducting the child into the cultural rules of emotional expression. Emotion talk also structures the child's own internal experience, and lets the child know about the internal experience of others

(Oatley *et al.* 2006: 302).

Though the connection between language and emotion had, for a long time, been neglected in linguistics (cf. Lyons 1982: 103, Finegan 1995: 2, Scheibman 2002: 7), by now a great variety of linguistic studies on language and emotion exist. However, while we may indeed talk of a new interest in emotive language, or the 'ecology of subjectivity' (Bublitz 2003: 389), there is, as yet, no unified theory of affect or emotion. Instead, we find a range of at times widely-differing approaches to the expression of emotion in general. One reason for this may be that the relation between language and emotion is itself quite complex: we

can express feelings that we have, we can have feelings that we do not express, and we can express feelings that we do not have (Daneš 1987: 174f, Caffi & Janney 1994). The feelings may be expressed consciously or subconsciously, intentionally or unintentionally, spontaneously (automatically) or strategically (Marty 1908, Daneš 1987, Planalp 1999: 71ff), and may relate to various aspects of the communicative context (Arndt & Janney 1987: 78–9). We can look at them in terms of the speaker's (self-) expression, the potential of language to express emotion, or the presumable influence on the hearer. All these different perspectives can be found in the various approaches to affect/emotion in linguistics, which furthermore adopt different viewpoints according to the sub-discipline of linguistics in which they can be situated:³

- **The cognitive approach:** cognitive-linguistic research on words that refer to emotions, that is, the 'emotion-lexicon' (Palmer & Occhi 1999: 15). This approach examines how emotions are conceptualized (for example in terms of *emotion schemata*) and is concerned with the question of the universality of emotions, the origin of linguistic expressions of emotions, and the relation between emotions and their linguistic labels. This strand of study is sometimes called *emotionology* (Athanasiadou & Tabakowska 1998b: xii) and is exemplified by Athanasiadou & Tabakowska (1998a), Harkins & Wierzbicka (2001), and Kövecses (for example Kövecses 2000).
- **The cross-linguistic approach:** the study of emotion terms across languages. This approach seeks to demonstrate that the expression of emotions relies on culturally determined notions of emotions. In this context, Wierzbicka's (for example 1992b, 1999) concept of 'semantic primitives' is most well-known (for a critique see Bamberg 1997b, Weigand 2004b). Other studies are Athanasiadou & Tabakowska (1998a), Ochs & Schieffelin (1989), Ungerer (1997), Harkins & Wierzbicka (2001), Kidron & Kuzar (2002), Dem'jankov *et al.* (2004) and Teubert (2004a, b).
- **The linguistic-anthropological approach:** studies in this area (for example Lutz & Abu-Lughod 1990, Irvine 1990, Palmer & Occhi 1999, Goodwin & Goodwin 2000) include work on language acquisition and ethnographic research on poetics and performance (Besnier 1990: 420ff). Studies of emotion in linguistic anthropology are also interested in '[t]he problem of how emotions are conceptualized, described, expressed, and realized in purposive actions in each language and culture' (Palmer & Occhi 1999: 2). Another focus is on emotion as social practice (Goodwin & Goodwin 2000).

- **The diachronic approach:** the attempt to trace the diachronic development of language that is associated with emotion. For example, Hübler (1998) explores the evolution of some grammatical means of expressivity in English; Györi (1998) is interested in semantic change concerning the conceptualization of emotions in different languages; and Teubert (2004a) tries to trace the origin of the feeling of guilt.
- **The functional approach:** many modern studies on emotion can be traced back to the historical tradition of research on the functions of language (for example, Marty 1908, Bühler 1934, Jakobson 1960, Stankiewicz 1964; see also Sarangi 2003 for research by Richards in the 1920s), and some more recent approaches to emotion also deal with the notion from a functional point of view (for example, Šabršula 1982, Péter 1984, Daneš 1987, Stankiewicz 1989, Martinet 1991, Foolen 1997). Related to these are approaches to affective/expressive language (for example, Charleston 1960, Leech 1974, Schneider 1991) or studies which are concerned with the specific status of signs with emotive meaning (usually in terms of the difference between indexical and symbolic meaning as elaborated by Peirce 1978: for example, Volek 1977, 1987, Konstantinidou 1997).
- **The syntactic approach:** studies concerning the syntax of emotion terms, for example the use of different prepositions (Dirven 1997, Osmond 1997, Radden 1998) or emotion verb complementation (Werth 1998).
- **The conversation analytic approach:** studies taking up the legacy of researchers such as Schegloff and Sacks to focus on the display of emotion in discourse, specifically talk in interaction, with an interest in turn-taking and other types of structural organization (Jefferson 1988, Sandlund 2004), and the '*embodied performance of affect*' (Goodwin & Goodwin 2000: 254, original emphasis).
- **The stylistic/literary approach:** the study of the emotional impact of stylistic devices, as well as analyses of narrative perspective, modality, evidentiality, and expressions of emotion in literature (Busse 1992: 177–236, Simpson 1993, van Meel 1994, Watson 1999, Downes 2000, Čmejrková 2004, Robinson 2005); the analysis of emotion as reader response (Oatley 1994, 2003). On Bally's influential stylistic approach, see Caffi & Janney (1994: 333–5) and Hübler (1998).
- **The psycholinguistic approach:** research concerning the development of emotions and related language in childhood – the ontogenetic perspective – for example, studies on the variation of emotional talk in different social strata (Burger & Miller 1999).

Compare Shaver *et al.* (1987: 1083–4), Bamberg (1997b), Niemeyer & Dirven (1997: section III), Planalp (1999: 140ff), Reilly & Seibert (2003), Painter (2003), Russell *et al.* (1995: section 3), and Oatley *et al.* (2006: 213–14, chapter 8).

- **The pragmatic/textlinguistic approach:** Studies in this area are interested in many aspects of language and emotion. Some examine ‘the conventional displaying of affect through linguistic means [for example pronouns, mood, tense/aspect/voice, intonation, lexis, discourse structure, affective speech acts]’ (Ochs & Schieffelin 1989: 7). Others are interested in emotive communication, where the notion is related to strategic uses of language, and is regarded as interactional, interpersonal, and other-directed (Caffi & Janney 1994: 328f). Arndt & Janney (1987) deal with the general influence of attitude on communicative decisions and regard emotive communication as a complex verbal, vocal, and kinesic phenomenon; Janney (1996) establishes emotive ‘strategies’ such as *approach* and *avoidance* (Janney 1996: 343ff). Ungerer (1997), on the other hand, looks at how emotions can be evoked in hearers, and Bublitz (2002, 2003) is interested in the ‘emotive prosody’ of texts, which express the speaker’s attitudes and emotions. Daneš focuses on how the expression of emotion is organized in text, in what he calls ‘the global emotional course (profile)’ of discourse (Daneš 1987: 177). Other studies analyze the connection between emotions and speech acts (Weigand 2004b: 16–18), and are interested in social constructivism (Bamberg 1991, 1997a, b) or ideological uses of emotion terms (Stubbs 1996: 85ff). Galasiński (2004) studies male emotion talk in connection with masculinity.

A special strand within the pragmatic approach is the **intensity/involvement approach**: *involvement* is the speaker’s ‘emotional engagement in the interaction, or ego-identification with the topic or partner of conversation’ (Janney 1996: 136f). Besnier (1994), Daneš (1994), Caffi & Janney (1994) and Watson (1999) give an overview of approaches to involvement (the classic reference is Chafe 1982). *Intensity* is defined as ‘the emotional expression of social orientation toward the linguistic proposition: the commitment of the self to the proposition’ (Labov 1984: 43f). Intensity markers are concerned with the degree of personal involvement of the speaker towards the described states of affairs (Dorf Müller-Karpusa 1990). Studies on intensity markers, or intensifiers, have focused on all aspects of speech that are capable of being modulated in terms of a higher on lesser degree of force. For examples see Janney (1996: 154, 160).

- **The systemic-functional approach:** systemic-functional linguistics is interested in affect in connection with *appraisal theory*, an approach to the interpersonal function of language (Martin & White 2005).

These approaches differ according to whether they concern the *language about emotion* (linguistic expressions denoting emotions) or *language as emotion* (linguistic expressions as conventionalized reflexes or indices of speakers' emotions) (Grondelaers & Geeraerts 1998: 357). Different terms have been used by researchers for these two aspects (Figure 1.1).




Figure 1.1 Language and emotion

Simplifying the matter slightly, the language about emotion or *emotion talk* is constituted by all those expressions in the dictionary that denote affect/emotion, for example *love, hate, joy, envy, sad, mad, enjoy, dislike* and so on (as well as fixed expressions such as *He had a broken heart*). Language as emotion or *emotional talk* relates to all those constituents (verbal, non-verbal, linguistic, non-linguistic) that conventionally express or signal affect/emotion (whether genuinely experienced or not, whether intentional or not). Examples that are mentioned in the relevant literature (see above) include intonation, mental process verbs, grading (intensifiers, comparison, quantifiers, mood, modality, negation), repetition, interpersonal metaphor, figurativeness, punctuation, interjections, affective derivation (diminutives/augmentatives), inversion, exclamation, syntactic markedness, pronoun use, emphatic particles, intensifiers, expletives, vagueness, affective connotations, evaluative adjectives, and many more. Paralinguistic devices are facial expressions, vocal cues, gestures, body posture, body movement, and physiological cues (see for example, Planalp 1999: 44ff).

However, approaches to language and emotion cannot neatly be classified according to these two broad categories, since 'the two [talk/writing about emotions and the interweaving of emotions and discourse] are related in a complex manner' (Besnier 1990: 437). Hence, emotional talk also often involves the first person usage of emotion terms (*I love*) – which on a *functional* level can be linked to expressing emotion (see also Kövecses 2000: 2) – whereas emotion talk comprises *all* usages of emotion terms, but excludes other emotional talk devices (Figure 1.2 on page 12). Consequently, some studies of affect/emotion only deal with emotional talk (sometimes including, sometimes excluding the usage of emotion terms); others deal only with emotion talk (for example the cognitive approach), and in others both approaches are combined (Harkins & Wierzbicka 2001, Lutz & Abu-Lughod 1990).

To make matters less complicated I shall from now on work with a strict definition of *emotional talk* as including all sorts of human behaviour that signal emotion *without* the recourse to linguistic expressions that explicitly denote emotion (*emotion talk*). I will thus use a strict dichotomy between signalling and denoting affect. This means that all expressions that denote affect whether they refer to the self or the other will be considered as part of emotion talk (rather than as part of emotional talk):

affect: self (1st person)	{	affect: signal (<i>Oh, fuck</i>)
	}	affect: denote (<i>I'm really angry</i>)

affect: other (non-1st person) $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{affect: signal (And then he goes} \\ \text{'Oh, fuck')} \\ \text{affect: denote (And he was very angry)} \end{array} \right.$

Whereas much research on affect (outside cognitive linguistics) concentrates on affect: self: express (that is, indications/signals of the emotions of the speaker), this study focuses on affect: self/other: denote. The main starting point of the analysis is thus simply lexis that denotes affect. The focus is on the usage in discourse of emotion terms (*emotion talk*) in British English, and no claims are made concerning a general (universal) theory of emotion or human psychology or languages other than English. The theoretical approach that is adopted here for the investigation of emotion terms is appraisal theory.




Figure 1.2 Emotional talk vs. emotion talk

1.4 Appraisal theory


Even though appraisal theory works within systemic functional linguistics (SFL), it can also be adopted in a more theory-neutral way to the analysis of language. This is the aim of my analyses in this book,

which – while being sympathetic to systemic functional linguistics (SFL) – is nevertheless not rooted in SFL as such, and is aimed both at the systemic functional (appraisal) analyst as well as any researcher interested in emotion talk (specifically, corpus linguists). It adopts appraisal theory as one of its methodological tools, with corpus and cognitive linguistics and pragmatic analysis as complementary tools. For this reason, the following discussion of appraisal theory ignores considerations of SFL as a theory of language in general (for outlines, see Halliday & Matthiessen 2004, Eggins 2004, Martin & Rose 2007).

But why adopt appraisal theory, if I do not consider myself a systemic linguist as such? It does seem to me that its classification of resources of interpersonal meaning lends itself in particular to discourse analytical purposes. Its focus is on language in its social function, rather than on language and the mind (as in cognitive linguistics), and it is based on the analysis of naturally occurring discourse, in line with corpus linguistic and textlinguistic principles. In contrast to the pragmatic approaches mentioned above, which focus more on general emotive strategies or on the broad concepts of intensity/involvement, it is also specifically suited to the analysis of emotion talk, since one of its sub-systems (affect) specifically describes this aspect of social meaning.

Appraisal deals with the expression of interpersonal meanings, including ‘resources for modalising, amplifying, reacting emotionally (affect), judging morally (judgment) and evaluating aesthetically (appreciation).’ (Martin 1995: 28). Although this is a comparatively new theory, there is already a large body of research making use of it (for example Christie & Martin 1997, Coffin 2006, Eggins & Slade 1997, Iedema *et al.* 1994, Macken-Horarik & Martin 2003, Martin 1995, 1997, 2000a, 2002, 2004a, Rothery & Stenglin 2000, White 2000, 2002, 2003a, b, 2004a, b, Martin & White 2005, Adendorff & de Klerk 2005) which continues to grow. Unless otherwise noted, the outline of appraisal in this chapter follows its most recent description by Martin & White (2005).

Appraisal is divided into three sub-systems: attitude, engagement, and graduation, with further sub-divisions:



Graduation and engagement concern the modification of the intensity or force of an utterance (graduation) as well as the degree of speaker commitment towards the utterance (engagement) and are not particularly relevant in the context of this book. Much more important for the analysis of affect is the attitude system. **Attitude** is concerned with evaluations relating to emotion, morality/ethics and aesthetics, consisting of the three sub-systems of affect, judgement and appreciation. (Incidentally, the relation between affect and appraisal had already been noted by the philosopher Bedford in the 1950s: see Bedford 1956/57.)

Affect has to do with describing positive and negative emotions, both of the speaker (authorial affect: *I love*) and third parties (non-authorial affect: *s/he loves, you love, they love*). Affect can be realized by adjectives (*a sad person*), verbs (*he cried, he loved him*), nouns (*his grief*) and adverbs (*desperately*). Affect can furthermore be classified according to six factors:

The feelings are culturally construed as positive or negative: positive affect (*the boy was happy*) vs. negative affect (*the boy was sad*).

The feelings are realized as a surge of emotion involving para- or extralinguistic manifestation or are more mentally experienced as an ongoing emotional state: behavioural surge (*the boy laughed, the captain wept*) vs. mental disposition (*the boy liked the present/felt happy, the captain disliked the present/felt sad*).

The feelings are construed as directed at/reacting to some external agency or as a general mood: reaction to other (*the boy liked the teacher/the teacher pleased the boy*) vs. undirected mood (*the boy was happy*).

The feelings are graded in terms of a cline of intensity: low (*like*) – median (*love*) – high (*adore*).

The feelings relate to future states or existing ones: realis (*the boy liked the present*) vs. irrealis (*the boy wanted the present*).

Emotions are grouped into three major sets: in/security (*the boy was anxious/confident*) – dis/satisfaction (*the boy was fed up/absorbed*) – un/happiness (*the boy was sad/happy*).

These factors will be described in more detail in Chapter 5, which deals with a modification of appraisal theory. It remains to be noted at this stage that whoever experiences the emotion is classified as the *emoter*, and what evokes the emotion as the *trigger*, for example: *The*

boy [emoter] *liked the present* [trigger]. This will become important in Chapter 3.

Judgement systems consist of resources for morally evaluating human actions, behaviour or character, by reference to a set of ethic norms. Judgement is subdivided into two broad categories: judgements of social esteem (normality: *standard–odd*, capacity: *clever–stupid*, tenacity: *brave–cowardly*) and judgements of social sanction (veracity: *honest–deceitful*, propriety: *moral–immoral*). These can be positive or negative (admiration vs. criticism).

Appreciation systems include resources used to evaluate the (aesthetic) quality of processes, things and products (and human beings when they are seen as entities), for example *It's a fantastic book*. Like affect and judgement, appreciation also has a positive and negative dimension, and is organized around three variables: reaction, composition, valuation. Reaction concerns the impact of the text/process on our attention (impact: *captivating–dull*) and its attitudinal impact (quality: *beautiful–ugly*). Composition concerns perceptions of proportionality/balance (balance: *harmonious–discordant*) and detail (complexity: *intricate–simplistic*) in a text/process. Valuation has to do with our assessment of the social significance of the appreciated entity (*profound–shallow*).

As becomes evident, not all sub-systems of attitude are of relevance here; rather, it is only the system of affect that concerns us. However, since there are some connections between judgement, appreciation and affect (White 2001: 3–4), and the borders between them are far from clear (Martin & White 2005: 57–61), both appreciation and judgement will at times come up in subsequent discussions. It must also be pointed out that both judgement and appreciation are considered as institutionalizations or recontextualizations of affect in appraisal theory:

AFFECT can perhaps be taken as the basic system, which is then institutionalized in two major realms of uncommon sense discourse. AS JUDGEMENT, AFFECT is recontextualized as an evaluation matrix for behaviour, with a view to controlling what people do. AS APPRECIATION, AFFECT is recontextualized as an evaluation matrix for the products of behaviour (and wonders of nature), with a view to valuing what people achieve.

(Martin 2000a: 147)

Appraisal has so far predominantly been applied to individual texts or relatively small corpora (for example Miller 2006), with the help of detailed manual analyses. (More recently, slightly larger

corpora – 500,000–2.6 million words – are used for the analysis of appraisal by Miller 1999, 2002, Adendorff & de Klerk 2005, and Kaltenbacher 2006, 2007; Coffin & O'Halloran 2005, 2006 also explore corpus linguistic methods for analyzing appraisal.)

In contrast, I shall use both large- and small-scale corpus data in investigating affect in this book. The study will consider affect in four different registers, adopting this vantage point from the register analyses by Biber and his colleagues (for example Biber *et al.* 1999) with respect to stance analysis, described in the following sections.

1.5 Stance analysis and register variation

Since his seminal study of variation in spoken and written language (Biber 1988), Biber has been identified with the corpus-based study of linguistic variation. Of particular concern here are studies that analyze the expression of *stance* in different registers.⁴ Stance is similar to appraisal and can be defined as 'the expression of personal feelings and assessments' (Conrad & Biber 2000: 57). The notion of stance includes three broad categories: epistemic stance (certainty/doubt), style stance (discourse comments), and attitudinal stance (positive/negative attitudes/feelings). Epistemic and style stance are not relevant here, but attitudinal stance is. This conveys speakers' attitudes, feelings or value judgements, including both emotion vocabulary (*happy, love*), and evaluative expressions (*wonderful, lovely, good*) (Biber *et al.* 1999: 968). Consequently, attitudinal stance is a broader notion than affect, making no distinction between the systems of affect, judgement and appreciation, and is more or less equivalent to attitude rather than affect. Furthermore, in some analyses of attitudinal stance no difference is made between *emotion talk* and *emotional talk*, so that, for example, expletives (*God, damn*) are included (Precht 2000: 67).

At the same time, analyses of attitudinal stance pick up only a small percentage of emotion talk, since the number of expressions considered as emotion terms is very low. This is because few emotion verbs, adjectives, adverbs and nouns are frequent enough to be included in a factor analysis, the corpus linguistic methodology most often used (Precht 2000: 68–71). Dry even argues that 60 per cent of emotion nouns in academic discourse are ignored by Biber & Finegan's (1989) methodology (Dry 1992, cited in Precht 2000: 13). Additionally, many studies of attitudinal stance are limited to the analysis of first person usage of emotion terms, since only these are said to be 'direct and explicit expressions of speaker attitude' (Biber & Finegan 1989: 97; for criticism see

Watson 1999). In any case, 'affect is the least-thoroughly analysed aspect of stance' (Precht 2000: 12).

Unfortunately, these three aspects (*attitudinal stance* equals the system of attitude rather than that of affect; only some emotion terms are included in the analysis; third-person references to emotion are disregarded) mean that the results of stance analyses are not directly comparable to the results undertaken here. What this study owes to stance analysis, and the analysis of register variation in general, is the insight that '[l]inguistic variation is central to the study of language use', that it is systematic, depends on many contextual factors, and that it should be analyzed with the help of corpora (Reppen *et al.* 2002a: vii). In this respect, I assume that emotion terms vary across registers, that only a corpus-based analysis can tell us about the details of this variation, and that the usage of emotion terms is related to the characteristics of the given registers. The analysis must include more than individual words, however, since much corpus linguistic research (for example Sinclair 2004a,b, Hoey 2006) has shown the importance of lexico-grammatical patterns such as collocation and colligation. With respect to this, Chapters 3 and 4 will take up the notions of local grammar (Hunston & Sinclair 2000) and FrameNet (<http://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/>), and will move beyond the investigation of individual emotion terms which is the focus of Chapter 2. The aims and methodology of this investigation will be outlined in the following sections.

1.6 Bringing it all together

1.6.1 Aims

As mentioned, the aim of this book is to study the usage of emotion terms (emotion talk) in four varieties (or *registers*) of British English in a large corpus including casual conversation, fiction, news reportage and academic discourse. An *emotion term* is defined as a lexical item that denotes emotion in a broad sense, namely affect, feelings, emotional states, moods, and so on (see Note 1). Prototypical examples are adjectives such as *happy*, *sad*, nouns such as *joy*, *anger*, adverbs such as *happily*, and verbs such as *love*, *hate*. Together, such lexical items make up the resources for emotion talk in British English.

More specifically, this book aims firstly at the **quantitative** establishment of *emotion profiles* for each register. This includes:

- **Lexical** variation: frequency and distribution of emotion terms (*emotion profile I*)

- **Part of speech** variation: frequency and distribution of word classes (*emotion profile II*)
- **Syntactic** variation: frequency and distribution of choices in grammatical paradigms (*emotion profile III*)
- **Lexico-grammatical** variation: frequency and distribution of syntagmatic lexico-grammatical patterns (*emotion profile IV*)

This large-scale corpus study of emotion terms (making use of a 19.5 million word corpus) is followed by an exploratory **pragmatic/discourse-analytic** analysis of emotion talk in a small subset of the corpus (~ 85,000 words). As a background to these analyses, I use a modified version of appraisal theory which is developed with the help of corpus linguistic data and insights from cognitive linguistics/psychology (Chapter 5).

Summing up, this book combines both large-scale and small-scale empirical studies, and takes up three important current approaches to the study of language, offering complementary perspectives: the systemic, the corpus linguistic, and the discourse-analytic. As Partington has pointed out as late as in 2004, discourse analysis and corpus linguistics are still rarely combined (Partington 2004: 11). The same is true to some extent for the combination of SFL and corpus linguistic data (Butler 2004: 147; for existing research see Thompson & Hunston 2006, Kaltenbacher 2007). The main focus will be on human discourse about emotion in actual, naturally-occurring language, and its polyfunctionality.

1.6.2 The corpus

The corpus used for the analysis of affect is a register-sensitive corpus of British English. *Register* is here used in Biber *et al.*'s (1999) sense, defining a variety of language that is based on external, non-linguistic, situational criteria:⁵

Register distinctions are defined in non-linguistic terms, with respect to situational characteristics such as mode, interactiveness, domain, communicative purpose, and topic. For example, newspaper editorials are distinguished as being (a) written, (b) published in a newspaper, and (c) primarily intended to express an informed opinion on matters already in the news.

(Biber *et al.* 1999: 15)

The chosen registers also broadly correspond to those analyzed by Biber and his colleagues (but see below): conversation, fiction, news, and academic discourse. As they note, '[t]hese registers have the virtue of being

(a) important, highly productive varieties of the language, and (b) different enough from one another to represent a wide range of variation' (Biber *et al.* 1999: 15–16). For the analysis of the four chosen registers, I used a custom-made corpus of British English compiled from various parts of the British National Corpus (BNC) with the help of Lee's (2002) classification of this corpus (see also Lee 2001). The aim was to compile a corpus that was as big as possible (to increase the reliability of the language data) while being as representative of the chosen registers as possible (within the limitations imposed by the contents of the BNC and based on language-external criteria). The main advantage of an approach that uses a publicly available classification system (Lee 2002) and corpus (the BNC) is its replicability (Oakey 2002: 115) – 'the scientists' favourite criterion' (Kilgarriff 1997a: 147). This corpus will from now on be referred to as **British Register Corpus** (BRC). (I will only give a brief outline of the corpus here, but its design is described in detail in Appendix A 1.1 online). The BRC consists of a conversation sub-corpus, a news reportage sub-corpus, a fiction sub-corpus and an academic discourse sub-corpus:

- **Conversation:** 4,206,058 words of casual conversational British English;
- **News reportage:** 2,613,399 words of British tabloid and broadsheet news reports, including arts/cultural material, commerce/finance, home/foreign news, science, lifestyle/leisure/belief and thought, and sports;
- **Fiction:** 6,688,459 words of adult fiction by male and female authors from 1985 to 1994 in book form;
- **Academic discourse:** 5,960,933 words of different types of written academic discourse from the humanities, medicine, natural sciences, politics/law/education, social/behavioural sciences, and technology/computing/engineering.

Although the chosen registers are roughly equivalent to those investigated by Biber, the equivalences are not total. For instance, the BRC sub-corpus of news reportage does not include (persuasive) editorials, and is thus more narrow than Biber's register of News. The corpus is also restricted to British English. (For further differences between the two corpora compare the design of the BRC as described in Appendix A 1.1 online, and Biber *et al.*'s 1999 description of the LSWE corpus). In total, the BRC consists of about 19.5 million words (Table 1.2 on p. 20).

The BRC is a *parallel* or *contrastive* corpus, since it aims to investigate differences between externally-identified varieties of British English

Table 1.2 The BRC (British Register Corpus)

Conversation	4,206,058 words
News reportage	2,613,399 words
Fiction	6,688,459 words
Academic discourse	5,960,933 words
Total	19,468,849 words

(Sinclair 2004c: 3). The four registers are differentiated by a variety of contextual/situational factors, as visualized in Table 1.3 (on p. 21).

As Biber *et al.* (1999) have outlined, conversation is characterized by the individual, local and personal, by immediacy and interactiveness; news reportage, in contrast, is more public, appeals to the nation as a whole, and has low degrees of interactiveness and immediacy. Fiction is mainly distinguished from news reportage by its communicative purpose, and its even more global appeal. Finally, academic discourse is much more specialist than all other registers, but shares some features with news discourse (low degrees of interactiveness and immediacy, providing information). These and other situational differences among the registers will be taken up again later when relating the findings of the analyses to a functional interpretation.

1.6.3 Emotion terms

In examining emotion talk in a large corpus the first task is to compile a comprehensive list of lexical items to be included in the analysis. After surveying much of the existing research on and lists of emotion terms (for example Wallace & Carson 1973, Nissenbaum 1985, Ortony *et al.* 1987, Storm & Storm 1987, Biber & Finegan 1989, Johnson-Laird & Oatley 1989, Nöth 1992, Janney 1996, Dirven 1997, Osmond 1997, Moore *et al.* 1999, Precht 2000),⁶ and consulting different dictionaries and thesauri, I decided to base my list of emotion terms on the classification provided by the 2001 *Encarta Thesaurus (ET)*, since this is, on the one hand, corpus-based, and, on the other hand, seemed the most comprehensive and accessible. Since the relevant thematic section (labelled *Emotions and States of Mind*) in the *ET* does not differentiate between emotions and states of minds, only a subset of this category was used for establishing the list of emotion terms (focusing solely on adjectives, adverbs, nouns and verbs), including the following semantic categories:

- Feelings about the past (n)
- Feelings about the future (n)

Table 1.3 Major situational differences among the BRC registers

	<i>Conversation</i>	<i>News reportage</i>	<i>Fiction</i>	<i>Academic discourse</i>
Mode	Spoken	Written (+ reported dialogue)	Written (+ fictional dialogue)	Written
Interactiveness and online production	Yes	Only in reported dialogue	Only in fictional dialogue	No
Shared immediate situation	Yes	No	No	No
Main communicative purpose	Personal communication	Information	Pleasure reading	Information/argumentation/explanation
Audience	Individual	Wide-public	Wide-public	Specialist
Dialect domain	Local	National	Global	Global

(adapted from Biber *et al.* 1999: 16).

- Pleasure, excitement, and elation (adj, adv, n) & Please and amuse (v)
- Appreciation and gratitude (adj, adv, n)
- Positive impatience, enthusiasm, and alertness (adj, adv, n)
- Sadness, distress, and despair (adj, adv, n) & Upset, distress, and humiliate (v)
- Confusion, anxiety, and worry (adj, adv, n) & Confuse and bewilder (v)
- Irritation and anger (adj, adv, n) & Anger and annoy (v) & Dislike and hate (v)
- Embarrassment and humiliation (adj, adv, n)
- Fear and panic (adj, n) & Frighten and shock (v)
- Insecurity and loss of composure (adj, adv, n)
- Surprise, shock, and amazement (adj, adv, n) & Surprise and impress (v)
- Envy and jealousy (adj, n)
- Love, respect, and goodwill (n) – Like, love, value, and enjoy (n, v)
- Compassion and forgiveness (n)
- Antagonism (n)
- Be concerned and care (v)
- Desire and want (adj, adv, n, v)

The result was a list of over 1500 lexical items, of which some items were excluded after careful scrutiny for a variety of reasons.⁷ Even though the final list of 1060 potential emotion terms (see Appendix A 1.3 online) is more comprehensive than many other lists, it is not argued that it is exhaustive, but rather that it contains a large selection of British English emotion terms.

The second step in the analysis of affect lies in determining which of these potential emotion terms actually occur and in which meaning, since it is only the 'emotion' meaning of a given form that is relevant. This issue – the problem of polysemy and homonymy (see for example Kilgarriff 1997b on polysemy) – lies at the heart of specifically lexical sense-sensitive corpus analysis: 'if a corpus is not annotated for sense it is not possible to quantify sense distributions and if the corpus is a large one, annotating each polysemous item for sense is not practical.' (Neale 2006: 147). Since computer software (in my case the Zurich BNCweb interface <http://escorp.unizh.ch/>, which allows different types of searches of the BNC, and my subset of it, the BRC) does not recognize meaning when searching for words, it will list all occurrences of a given word form, regardless of its meaning. For example, a computer

program looking up *afterglow* will come up with all occurrences of the form *afterglow*, referring to:

- 1 the light that is left in the sky after the sun has set
- 2 a pleasant feeling after a good experience

(*Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary*, henceforth *OALD*).

Only meaning 2 would be included as denoting affect/emotion, whereas all occurrences of meaning 1 would need to be excluded. Since automated tools simply cannot reliably recognize semantic differences at present,⁸ the classification of all words according to meaning had to be done manually. In other words, all occurrences of the 1060 emotion terms were classified by me as denoting emotion (or not). This is a rather cumbersome method, but comes much closer to finding out about what we are interested in than would a purely automatic computer analysis. As Kilgarriff notes:

A computer word count program defines a word as any string of characters separated by blanks or punctuation. ... [T]hat makes counting easy and has the advantage that everyone knows where they stand and will arrive at the same numbers. The disadvantage, of course, is that it doesn't tell the truth. ... Any step towards the truth (as linguists strive to define it) tends to be a step away from anything that is computationally straightforward.

(Kilgarriff 1997a: 144).

At the same time, this means that the analysis is less easily replicable than a computationally straightforward, automated corpus study, and retains some elements of subjectivity in the interpretation of the meaning of emotion terms. The result of this manual analysis is a sense frequency list, not a word frequency list.

Concerning cases where the same word form can realize different parts of speech (for example *love*, *hate* as noun or verb), this was only a small problem since all of the BNC (and therefore also the BRC) is POS-tagged using the CLAWS system (Garside 1987). This tagging has an accuracy rate of 96.5 per cent (Leech *et al.* 2001: 14), which means that about 3.5 per cent of mistakes remain (see Sinclair 2004d: 81 on this problem). In any case, my interest lies more in reporting tendencies than exact figures, taking into account the subjective nature of the meaning-sensitive analysis reported above.

It remains to be pointed out that emotion terms and emotion talk do not necessarily stand for or represent the speaker's or others' 'real' internal affective state; rather emotion talk represents what Galasiński (2004: 6) calls a *discursive practice* (compare also Edwards 1999), and 'reflects what one displays to others either in a conscious and deliberate manner, or as a result of habit of expression that accumulates with experience' (Anderson & Leaper 1998: 410). To give an example from contemporary culture, film critic Philip Lopate has pointed out (in an interview included on the DVD) that in Noah Baumbach's 2005 film *The Squid and the Whale*, the father (Bernard Berkman) keeps using emotion talk – statements such as *That hurt me* or *I feel bad now* – to manipulate others, while remaining strangely detached from his own emotional experience.

1.7 Outline of this book

To sum up the most important aims of this book again, these are:

- to examine emotion terms and their patterns in terms of register variation (emotion profiling);
- to develop appraisal theory;
- to analyze the functions of emotion talk in the different registers.

The hope is that the combination of a functional approach (Martin's systemic-functional appraisal theory) with two corpus-linguistic approaches (Biber's theories concerning register variation, and Hunston's local grammar approach, which will be described in Chapter 3) will result in a development of present studies on emotion talk.

Chapter 2 outlines the results of the large-scale corpus investigation of emotion profiles in the four registers in terms of lexical variation, part of speech variation and syntactic variation. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the local grammar approach to affect, and outline the most important affect patterns and their functions in conversation, news reportage, fiction and academic discourse (lexico-grammatical emotion profiling). Chapter 5 develops the modified version of appraisal theory that was applied in the manual analysis of the 85,000-word subset of the BRC. The results of this exploratory analysis are described in Chapter 6. Hence, corpus linguists may be particularly interested in Chapters 2 to 4, and systemic functional linguists in Chapters 5 and 6.

Notes

1. In this book I use the terms *emotion* and *affect* more or less interchangeably as referring to emotional experience. I will, however, consistently employ the terms *emotion talk*, *emotional talk* and *emotion terms* (rather than, say, *affect talk*, *affective talk* and *affect terms*). Nevertheless, it is also necessary to use *affect*, because this book makes reference throughout to the system of affect as recognized in appraisal theory (Section 1.4). In more narrow definitions, distinctions are made between affect and emotion, emotions and feelings, moods, emotional attitudes, emotional traits, emotional disorders, emotional plots, emotion-related states and so on (Ortony *et al.* 1987, Ekman 1992, Caffi & Janney 1994: 327–8, Anderson & Leaper 1998: 426, Jahr 2000: 9–10, Downes 2000: 102–3, Mees 2006: 15–16, Oatley *et al.* 2006: 29–30).
2. Dichotomies always simplify and emotions involve many aspects at the same time: they are both biological and cultural, personal and social and so on (see for example Planalp 1999: 134). It may be worth noting that neurological research has shown that the juxtaposition of emotion vs. ratio is misguided, with human rationality depending crucially on emotion (Turner & Stets 2005: 21–2). For a discussion of the debate concerning emotion vs. ratio see Milton & Svašek (2005: 2–4).
3. Since there is such a wealth of studies on language and emotion (for extensive bibliographies, see Arndt & Janney 1987, Besnier 1990, Janney 1996, van Dijk 2001), it was necessary to exclude from this overview: (a) studies that focus on aspects such as intonation, prosody, pitch, facial expression, gazing patterns, gesture (for example Arndt & Janney 1987, Selting 1994); (b) most studies that focus on languages other than English (for example Fiehler 1990, Haviland 1991, Fries 1995, Günther 1997, Jahr 2000, Koven 2004); (c) much non-linguistic (for example psychological, philosophical, sociological, anthropological) emotion research. It must also be noted that there are many overlaps, and that only the most important approaches are covered; more recently, corpus-based methodology has been used in some of these studies (Teubert 2004a, b, Dem'jankov *et al.* 2004).
4. The term *stance* is also closely associated with analyses of academic discourse (for example Hyland 1999 and references in Bednarek 2006a), and there is also a research project on analyzing stance in spoken American English (<http://www.ekl.oulu.fi/stance/index.html>, accessed 27 September 2005), with a focus on intersubjectivity and conversation analysis. Such studies usually include more than the analysis of affect (for example modality, evidentiality, evaluation), and are therefore only partly relevant to the research undertaken here.
5. The notion of *register* overlaps with related concepts such as *genre*, *domain*, or *text type* (compare Lee 2001). For systemic-functional notions of genre and register cf. Martin (1993), Halliday & Matthiessen (1999), Martin & Rose (2007).
6. Nöth (1992) gives an overview of lists of emotion terms from psychological research. Most such research is intuition- and/or informant-based (for example using elicited or free-listed emotion terms), with some also using information from dictionaries and thesauri or previous research. The number of emotion terms identified by this research varies depending on how an

emotion term is defined: Moore *et al.* (1999) mention 415 emotion terms, Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1989) list 590 words, and Storm & Storm (1987) use 787 different terms, while Wallace & Carson (1973) and Oatley *et al.* (2006: 183) both mention a list of over 2000 emotion terms, and other figures also appear in the relevant research. In a corpus linguistic study, Precht (2000) included 366 different word-forms indicating attitudinal stance, but these include both expressions with evaluative meanings (for example *awful*, *bitch*) and emotion terms (*adore*, *angry*). In a sense, any list of emotion terms will to a certain extent remain subjective, as emotion terms – like other lexical items – make up a fuzzy set with prototypical, core, and marginal members (Section 5.3.2.2).

7. Words in the *ET* that were on the border of affect were excluded (for example *alert*, *alive*, *be sure of*) – see Appendix A 1.2 online. Similarly, references to behaviour associated with emotion were not included, since the focus was on mental disposition terms rather than behavioural surge terms (see Section 1.4 above). Others had to be excluded for purely methodological purposes; for instance, they were too polysemous, too difficult to analyze objectively, or occurred too often to analyze manually (for example the modal verb *will* as indicating volition vs. other modal meanings).
8. One possible solution would be to use corpus analysis in order to identify the most common words that occur in the context of *afterglow* when used in meaning 2, a methodology similar to the one used by Teubert (2004a), or to use a collocation dictionary for the same purpose when the number of words analyzed is too large to investigate separately. It would then become possible to search only for occurrences of *afterglow* in the context of these common collocates. However, not all emotion terms are listed in all their meanings in collocation dictionaries such as the *Oxford Collocations Dictionary*, and the analysis would still not be completely reliable. Watters (2002) shows that cluster analysis (grouping word senses on the basis of their collocates) works in 69 per cent of classifications for primary word senses, but only in 25 per cent of classifications for secondary word senses. See also Kilgarriff (1997b) for an overview of word sense disambiguation in natural language processing. A related approach is to identify the grammatical frame in which a lexical expression is used to exclude non-affective meanings (Precht 2000, 2003). For example, *afraid* + prepositional phrase (*I'm afraid of spiders*) indicates fear, whereas *afraid* + *that*-clause (*I'm afraid that's impossible*) refers to the speaker's thoughts (Precht 2000: 43) and is a more formulaic usage. But see Werth (1998) who argues that the usage of emotion terms as indicating either 'genuine' emotion or as a conventional expression does not depend on grammatical frames alone.

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